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A Response to Professor Marshall
Michael W. McConnellt
I said in my article critiquing Smith that the theoretical argument in support of its position is "serious and substantial, even if
mistaken."' Professor Marshall demonstrates the truth of at least
the first of these propositions. Space does not permit- a point-bypoint rebuttal, but a few areas of disagreement are sufficiently important to warrant mention.
The heart of Marshall's position is that free exercise exemptions are a form of "favoritism for religious belief over other beliefs. ' '2 He can say this, however, only by ignoring the symmetrical
character of the free exercise and establishment principles. Both
"single out" religion for special treatment, but sometimes this is an
advantage and sometimes a disadvantage. When a Jehovah's Witness refuses to work in an armaments factory, he is constitutionally entitled to unemployment benefits,3 while a secular antiwar
activist in the same position is not. 4 In this context, it may appear
that religion is "favored." But if a public school football coach (or
even a member of the team) offers a prayer or other religious inspiration before the game, he will be stopped; a girls' tennis coach
who offers feminist words of inspiration before the game engages in
protected speech. When the Reverend Jerry Falwell's Liberty University applied recently for public bonds, it was turned down because of its religious teaching;' no one would consider turning
down Antioch College because of its secular ideology. In these contexts, religion seems "disfavored." It is simply not accurate to describe the pre-Smith constitutional scheme, taken as a whole, as
"favoritism" for religion.
It would be possible to accept Marshall's position on free exercise of religion (no "singling out") and still maintain consistency
t Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
I Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U Chi
L Rev 1109, 1129 (1990).
2 William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U Chi
L Rev 308, 319 (1991).
3 Thomas v Review Board, 450 US 707, 719 (1981).
See Marshall, 58 U Chi L Rev at 319 (cited in note 2).
5 Habel v IndustrialDevelopment Authority, 1991 Va LEXIS 5 (S Ct Va).
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with the Establishment Clause. This would mean that religion cannot be "singled out" under either clause. If a public school teacher
wants to tell his class about the importance of a personal relationship with Jesus Christ, that would be no different from holding
forth about the importance of Martin Luther King or of protecting
the environment. But that is not Marshall's position. As he says,
"the Establishment Clause uniquely singles out government advancement of religion as a matter to be avoided.... [T]here is no
comparable limitation on other types of belief systems."' Having
embraced the "singling out" position with reference to establishment, why is Marshall so reluctant to extend it to free exercise?
Marshall's admonitions about the difficulty of defining and
identifying religion-about which he says I seem "delightfully unconcerned" -are, of course, no less pertinent under the Establishment Clause than under the Free Exercise Clause. But now it is
Marshall who is unconcerned. Apparently, in Marshall's world, religion can be "singled out" only for the purpose of exclusion from
government benefits. When government interference is at issue, religion must be accorded protection no greater than that given secular beliefs." This combination-"singling out" under the Establishment Clause, "equal treatment" under the Free Exercise
Clause-is a powerful instrument for the secularization of society.
It is hard to see anything "neutral" about it.
Marshall suggests at one point that his view of the Establishment Clause might not preclude statutory religious exemptions.9
But his explanation for why the free exercise exemption "offends
Establishment Clause principles""' is equally applicable to statutory exemptions: "Special treatment for religion connotes sponsorship and endorsement; providing relative benefits for religion over
non-religion may have the impermissible effect of advancing religion."'" If Marshall is right about free exercise exemptions, he
must be wrong about statutory exemptions; "special treatment" is
special treatment, whether judicial or statutory. But if he admits
that under his reasoning statutory exemptions are unconstitu-
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tional, Marshall forfeits any possible support for his position in
precedent, 12 history,13 or a jurisprudence of judicial restraint. 4
Those who claim that religion may not be "singled out" must
grapple with the very text of the First Amendment, which refers
specifically to "religion." Why religion is distinguished from other
forms of belief is open to many interpretations, but that it was
distinguished seems undeniable. 5 My position is not "that the
Constitution prefers religious belief."' 6 Rather, I contend that the
Constitution treats religious belief differently-sometimes better,
sometimes worse, depending on whether the context is one of interference or advancement. The unifying principle is that the reli-
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The Supreme Court has unanimously upheld the legitimacy of statutory religious

exemptions. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints v Amos, 483 US 327, 338 (1987). Even Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens,
whose views of the Establishment Clause are the strictest on the Court, agree that "legislative exemptions ...that were designed to alleviate government intrusions that might significantly deter adherents of a particular faith from conduct protected by the Free Exercise
Clause" are permissible. Texas Monthly, Inc. v Bullock, 489 US 1, 18 n 8 (1989) (plurality
opinion).
13 While the historical evidence bearing on whether the Free Exercise Clause was understood or expected to vest the courts with authority to create exceptions from generally
applicable laws on account of religious conscience is divided, there is abundant evidence
that religious exemptions were deemed legitimate. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins
and Historical Understandingof Free Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv L Rev 1409, 1511-12
(1990).
14 The emerging position among the conservatives on the Court seems'to be to take the
narrowest plausible view of both religion clauses. This at least has the virtue of consistency.
Under this view, religious exemptions are constitutionally permissible and even "desirable"
(the Court's word, see Smith v Employment Division, 110 S Ct 1595, 1606 (1990)), but they
must be made by the political branches, not by the courts. This approach has nothing in
common with Marshall's position, because his opposition to free exercise exemptions rests
on their supposed inconsistency with constitutional values under the Free Exercise Clause,
the Free Speech Clause, the Establishment Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause. Marshall, 58 U Chi L Rev at 310-13, 319-22 (cited in note 2). Advocates of judicial restraint
would, presumably, disagree with Marshall on every point.
,1My statement that "the Free Exercise Clause, understood as Madison understood it,
reflected a theological position," McConnell, 57 U Chi L Rev at 1152 (cited in note 1), seems
to have misled Marshall-though this is my fault, not his. My statement was unclear. I do
not, as Marshall infers, believe that "the Constitution embodies a special commitment to
theistic obligation," Marshall, 58 U Chi L Rev at 327 (cited in note 2), in any religious sense.
As I said in the article, not all the framers (and perhaps not Madison) accepted the phenomenon of religion as true "as a matter of personal faith." McConnell, 57 U Chi L Rev at
1152 n 184 (cited in note 1). Atheists no less than committed believers can coherently support the principles of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. I meant only that the
distinction between religion and other beliefs, to be understood, requires reference to perspectives internal to religion (hence "theological"). Viewed from a secular perspective, religion is just another ideology. Only by examining the unique character and claims of religion
as they are perceived by belieyers (and by non-believers who apprehend their power and
importance) can we appreciate why the framers of our Constitution were so concerned that
the federal government be precluded from meddling in this aspect of human life.
16 Marshall, 58 U Chi L Rev at 322 (cited in note 2).
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gious life of the people should be insulated, to the maximum possible degree, from the effect of governmental action, whether
favorable or unfavorable. To extend this principle to all other beliefs and activities would be impossible.

